The Pacific Blue pilot accused of carelessly operating an aircraft at Queenstown in 2010 was "probably the absolute top of the tree in terms of aircraft qualifications", his lawyer told Judge Kevin Phillips in the Queenstown District Court yesterday.
The 54-year-old Auckland pilot, who has name suppression, denies the charge.
On June 22, 2010, the flight carrying 65 passengers and six crew, including the captain and first officer, took off from the resort bound for Sydney.
The Civil Aviation Authority charged the pilot in April, alleging the plane took off in near darkness, potentially endangering the 71 people on board.
Yesterday, defence counsel Matthew Muir, of Auckland, said there was a "significant danger" in elevating an alleged breach of Pacific Blue's exposition (policy statement), to "criminality".
The flight was scheduled to depart at 4.30pm, but took off at 5.25pm, meeting the "basic daylight requirements" by taking off 20 minutes before the advised Evening Civil Twilight (ECT) time.
However, it was a potential breach of the company's exposition, so it had to be proven "there was such a failure and the pilot decided in a manner that was not reasonable and prudent" to take off.
Pacific Blue's exposition required take-offs to occur "at least 30 minutes prior to Evening Civil Twilight to allow for visual manoeuvring".
"The defendant will say given the range of exposition requirements, a breach of Pacific Blue's exposition at the time ... can't, in itself, be equated with carelessness."
He said the captain and first officer formed a departure plan "which did not involve a return to Queenstown", and the only visual manoeuvre required was between the airport and a reference point, which took about two minutes' flight time to reach.
"It had completed, we say, all the visual manoeuvres it was going to do that day ... still with 18 minutes running before Evening Civil Twilight."
Further, a "return to land scenario" would not only represent "very poor professional judgement", but it was prohibited in Pacific Blue's exposition, given there was an "alternate airport" available and suitable in terms of weather conditions.
Alternate airports had to be available; have a runway at least 45m wide; and be within one hour of flying time in clear air with one engine.
Queenstown's alternates were Wellington, Christchurch, Dunedin and Invercargill.
Because Queenstown's runway was only 30m wide, it was not an alternate airport.
"We are saying that the pilot was faced with conflicting messages in the Pacific Blue exposition," Mr Muir said.
If an aircraft had established take-off minimums for Queenstown, but could not establish the landing minimums, an aircraft "may still go, provided you have an alternate".
On June 22, Christchurch airport was chosen as the preferred alternative.
Mr Muir said there were "very real issues" about the weather and the crew came to a decision with Christchurch available "they couldn't lawfully re-land at Queenstown in any event".
"He says 'I can't come back to Queenstown now that I've identified my departure alternative. I'm minded to go to Christchurch; all I've got to consider is my visual manoeuvre to get me [to the reference point]'.
"He makes the perfectly rational decision ... he's still got 18 minutes [before ECT] ... and that's an appropriate and sound decision to make."
Mr Muir said the aircraft weighed 59 tonnes, giving it a significant performance advantage.
"He can put that in his back pocket, knowing he can out-perform the minimum gradients because of his light weight."
While the weather updates were provided to pilots through an automated service, the pilot was not bound by the information, but took it into account along with his own knowledge.
"The defendant's case is that [for] these pilots who are trained into Queenstown, it is absolutely crucial to their training to understand ... and be able to make their own assessment [about the weather conditions].
"He brought to bear his own observations sitting out at the [end] of the runway for a significant period of time."
Mr Muir said the pilot taxied to the end of the runway and remained stationary using wind socks as reference points for the wind, because the cross-wind exceeded a 16-knot limitation.
Wind gusts were monitored for "quite an extended period" because while take-off minimums had been established, the cross-wind was too high.
Mr Muir referred to three "calls" to the pilot by the first officer after take-off - all of which he described as "unremarkable and good crew management".
"Singularly or cumulatively, the informant relies on those as proving the [defendant] was less than prudent.
"The defendant's view is it was unremarkable and good crew management."
The hearing continues today.
