No 'unacceptable' risk found

Pacific Blue's internal investigation into flight 89 from Queenstown to Sydney in June 2010 concluded there was "no evidence" passengers were exposed to an "unacceptable level of risk", Judge Kevin Phillips heard yesterday.

On the fifth day of a defended hearing for the plane's 54-year-old pilot, an Auckland man with name suppression, counsel Matthew Muir spent the majority of the day cross-examining Virgin New Zealand Australia (formerly Pacific Blue) flight operations manager Geoffrey Lowe in the Queenstown District Court.

The pilot denies a charge of operating a plane carelessly on June 22, 2010.

Mr Muir referred to the Pacific Blue investigation into the incident which found no "wilful intent" by the flight crew not to conform to the company's operational procedures; the airline's Evening Civil Twilight (ECT) requirements were not observed, "however, that depends on a proper interpretation of the relevant operational procedures at the time"; the weather was "changeable" and tended towards a lift in the cloud level and improving visibility; and it was the crew's opinion conditions "would have allowed a return to land if required".

The report also said before departure, flight crew considered the area around Queenstown suitable for visual manoeuvring if required "however, [the pilot] stated due to fluctuating weather conditions, he would only return in the case of a serious emergency, otherwise he would [divert to] Christchurch".

Regarding ECT, the report said the captain's interpretation was the company's exposition [policy statement] at the time allowing "for visual manoeuvring"offered "some relief".

"He considered he would not be required to [return to] Queenstown, except in a serious emergency ..."

Mr Muir said the defendant was one of the airline's "most senior, qualified and experienced" pilots. He asked Mr Lowe why Pacific Blue twice changed its exposition on ECT departures after the incident.

The first change to the wording was made in August 2010 and the second in December 2011.

Mr Muir asked when someone as senior as the defendant interpreted the exposition in a way "that did not accord with what Pacific Blue intended", was it a "flag that it may be necessary to clarify" the intention?"We were disappointed [the defendant] didn't telegraph this information earlier and we would only learn of this information in the report itself," Mr Lowe said.

"We take safety seriously, we can't necessarily wait for an investigation report to conclude, so we act quickly," Mr Lowe said.

Mr Muir contended Pacific Blue's exposition and manuals could be subject to different interpretations and required inferences in respect of the situation in Queenstown which were not clearly stated.

"Pilots cannot be clairvoyants and shouldn't be expected to be clairvoyants ... they should be provided with clear instruction in their exposition," he said.

Mr Lowe said the company had a "robust" reporting system around occurrences and there had been no issues reported with regard to confusion.

In response Mr Muir said it had come "fair, square and centre to the Queenstown District Court in a two-week hearing for a careless use charge".

The defendant's case is having regard to the weight of the aircraft that day - 59 tonnes, which was lighter than normal - he knew he would be able to reach the required altitude even if one engine failed as he left Queenstown.

Due to fading light he had ruled out a return to Queenstown, had Christchurch Airport as an alternative and could have requested an alternate departure route with Queenstown Airport tower, if required.

However, Civil Aviation Authority counsel Fletcher Pilditch said the exposition required him to have two different plans in the event of an engine failure, depending on "whether or where" it occurred.

If the failure occurred early in the flight, before a position known as "tollgate", it required the plane to complete a figure-of-eight circuit and land back at Queenstown.

However, conditions that night would have made it a "perilous exercise" and one which could not be completed before ECT, Mr Pilditch said.

If the failure occurred after tollgate, the aircraft was to continue to its alternate airport.

Mr Pilditch said the defendant had only one plan in the event of an engine failure - to keep going "irrespective of where the engine failure occurred" and the informant was not aware he had planned to request a second departure route.

The case continues next week.

 

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