Ashlee Vance recalls a story in his biography of Elon Musk in which Musk tasked an engineer to make an in-house flight computer for SpaceX, which at the time cost $5 million, for under $5000. The engineer created it for $3600.
This is one of numerous examples of private industry propelling the development of the second space race.
By reducing the cost of entry to space, there are now fears that the new space race will further amplify the cracks in the existing world order.
While the first space race saw head-to-head competition between the Soviet Union and the United States, the second space race has a plethora of state and private competitors, from the dominant Space X to Invercargill local Peter Beck’s Rocket Lab.
Thus, as humanity switches its focus back to the stars, it is crucial to guarantee that there is a strong Liberal International Order (LIO) to ensure that space remains a peaceful and co-operative arena for the benefit of all humankind in which both state and private interests are protected.
The LIO depicts an international context in which free markets, democracy, and multilateral co-operation dovetail to sustain the rule of law. The goal of the LIO is to integrate states into institutions such as the United Nations, World Trade Organisation and the International Monetary Fund.
This will give states a stake in a stable, liberal order by having the benefits of participation in international institutions outweigh the negatives.
However, the LIO has been under strain in recent years. A recent report from the Freedom House stated that "in every region of the world, democracy is under attack".
In this decade alone, LIO institutions have failed to solve issues in every corner of the world, from Sudan, Gaza and Ukraine, to Myanmar, Colombia and Papua New Guinea.
Furthermore, China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea and beyond, and the US' selective adherence to international law, has fuelled worries that the limitations of the LIO will be replicated in the second space race.
Such failures should concern everyone, including here in New Zealand.
Space epitomises humanity, and a functional LIO is essential. In an unforgiving, inhospitable environment, only multilateral collaboration can bring about the safe use of space for everyone.
The constraints of space require a rules-based system to maximise the useability of space for research, manufacturing, and satellites for all participants.
This approach has been reflected in treaties such as the Outer Space Treaty of 1969, which encompasses crucial provisions such as Articles II and IV.
Article II states that the moon and other celestial bodies are not subjected to national appropriation by any means, while Article IV prohibits the establishment of military bases and the testing of weapons.
However, since there is no higher authority than sovereign states, treaties largely rely on states' voluntary compliance with such principles. While certain treaties have punishments for breaking them, no explicit enforcement measures are outlined in the space treaties.
In the past two decades, China, India, Russia and the US have all conducted anti-satellite weapons tests, causing space debris, which violates Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty.
Although each incident received condemnation from the world, erosion of the LIO contributes to a climate in which states and private industries are increasingly tempted to ignore the principles outlined in certain space treaties.
Furthermore, a decline in the LIO has slowed down much-needed additions to space law regarding private ventures and space weapons.
The Artemis Accords, established by the US in 2020, are an attempt to establish rules for the second space race.
However, despite currently having 42 signatories, two other major space-faring nations have refused to sign the accords. Citing concerns about the Artemis Accords seeking to legally override the principles of the Outer Space Treaty, China and Russia’s refusal to sign highlight the failures of the current LIO in obtaining consensus on crucial areas of concern.
The ramifications of a declining LIO can be seen in the Russia-Ukraine war, in which the Russian government argued that shooting down Elon Musk’s privately owned Starlink satellites is legal under international law as the Ukrainian army is using Starlink for military purposes [to counter the illegal Russian invasion].
An updated space treaty is required to rectify these concerns; however, without a robust LIO, achieving widespread co-operation and endorsement of space treaties is likely unattainable.
States like the US have already voiced concerns about replicating the current LIO limitations in space.
Bill Nelson, Nasa’s current administrator, suggests that the days of the LIO being the central framework for space exploration may be coming to an end: "I do not want China to get to the south pole of the moon first with humans, then say this is ours, stay out!"
That statement indicates there are genuine worries that increasing US-China competition could spill over into space and threaten the prohibition of sovereign claims to celestial bodies.
There is validity to these claims given China’s persistent ambitions to establish a world order grounded not in shared values and norms, as the LIO does, but rather in mutually beneficial trade relations.
China’s ambitions are fulfilled in the creation of the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), a collaborative project initiated by Russia and China that plans to build a research base on the moon. It proposes to be a symbol of the alternative international order, directly contradicting the United States’ LIO hegemony.
Although the competition between the Soviet Union and the US was intense during the Cold War, there was never any credible threat that one of the states would ignore the fundamental tenets of the Outer Space Treaty. Having two opposing systems of governance in space amplifies the risks associated with all space operations.
Thus, trust in international institutions must be rebuilt to ensure the second space race does not descend into an unregulated and exceptionally dangerous geopolitical contest.
• Jack Smith is a Master of International Studies student at the University of Otago.
