Speech notes of John Martin for an address to the Queenstown chamber of commerce on 21 July, 2010.
Some like-minded locals were stunned recently when they heard that the community's shareholding in QAC had been sold down to 75.01% and might go down further to 65%.
I'm one of those stunned locals. It just didn't seem right. It can't be right, surely.
Please note its not about Aucklanders I'd feel the same whoever was the counterparty. We are bigger than narrow-minded parochialism today, as we all have to be more worldly and open to new orders.
It's the principle of it and stupidity of it for the region that concerns us, no matter who is involved.
Around the world big corporations with lots of clever executives and money out to make more money ride shotgun over locals who don't see it coming or are afraid or too poor to look after their interests.
We simply had to do something, to step up and see what was really going on. Yes we are self-interested. Many of us have over decades contributed to the growth of this economy, to make this town a better and wealthier place. Work for good people.
I must observe that John Davies has contributed significantly to the progressive development of the airport to what it is today for the community. He has substantial businesses here that are dependent on a quality airport. Of course he's concerned, so should everyone be.
We're concerned about democracy, independence and our long-term economic welfare, so we formed the Queenstown Community Strategic Assets Group.
We also don't want to be seen as dummies to be taken advantage of while asleep at the wheel. We were the brave ten, but our numbers are swelling as people hear more and think about it. We are not a bunch of rebels to be afraid of (unless of course you've done wrong!). I' m just over 5' and 65 kilos to be afraid of, I don't think so.
There is no profit from war. We all have to live with each other, and we will have our differences from time to time.
I know this is polarising people, but open debate and concern is healthy in a community. That is democracy stirred into action. That is good. We are here to talk openly and to be constructive. We don't hide. Bad things happen in the dark, so let the light in.
Of importance, upfront I want to assure you we have not tried to buy nor want to own the airport for ourselves.
My colleague John Darby some time ago suggested to council a concept to think about whereby some infrastructure assets like parking, the airport and a new bridge at Frankton could go into a community strategic assets trust for the protection and longer term funding of the community. A good idea I think, in light of what has happened.
QAC chairman Mark Taylor is reported as saying locals are afraid of us, and they should make the extra 10% happen to show us who is boss.
We the community should all be afraid of the conduct of QAC directors and our Mayor Clive Geddes.
The grab of 24.99% of QAC by AIA from QLDC forced on it by the QAC board looks to us, based on what we know so far, to be unlawful. To go to 35% would only compound the mess on flawed foundations.
We want every one, particularly the QAC board and AIA, to be on notice upfront now that a wrong has been done, and it needs to be corrected, even if that takes some time. A forced marriage is usually a bad marriage. We need to address this soonest.
The forced marriage is an abuse of both the democratic process and commercial prudence. Both of which are expected to protect the community in respect of a rare and valuable strategic asset, our airport, the gateway to our local economy with a unique market position.
A snow job?
We see a deal done in secret, pushed by the QAC directors with no informed community mandate to do so and a council that seems was kept in the dark or misinformed as to the facts and legality.
It is not my group that needs to justify its actions, it is for the council, its executive and QAC directors to reflect on points we are raising and to prove a decision to sell down was justified and properly made, and that this is timely, at best value and most importantly, is lawful.
Perhaps there has been a progressive disconnect between QLDC and the business community, and perhaps we and QLDC have become sloppy - but to me it defies belief this deal happened.
There is council policy, protocols and processes for Africa that talk about things like transparency, consultation, best practice and governance, community involvement and the like there is Local Government Act to protect us - what happened?
The probity of this deal and governance in a democracy go to the heart of the issue. Every one should be afraid if we are right not only at local government level, but at central government level.
Ask yourself, can public strategic assets be sold down by a few directors, not shareholders, to whoever at whatever value they think without proper community consultation and consent?
I thought that's what the Local Government regime and fiduciary duties protected us from so that we could sleep safe in our beds and do our business. If it doesn't, then the regime is a mirage, and we should be afraid.
What is next? In our view, the democratic process has been expediently sidestepped, parked as it were and paid lip service, so a deal they didn't want to have publicly reviewed and approved before it was done got done.
The old maxim comes to mind that its easier to seek forgiveness than to get permission.
QAC chairman Mark Taylor is reported as saying they "couldn't wait for consultation" (ODT 14.7.10).
Our Mayor, Clive Geddes is reported as saying these are just "minor issues of process" (ODT 14.7.10).
They took thirty pieces of silver for part of the family silver without the family giving permission.
I can't help but observe this conduct is more akin to a coup detat on the community - engineered by the QAC chairman and the Mayor and Deputy Mayor, whom both knew of the deal and foolishly signed confidentiality agreements, ambushed other councillors in a rush and told the community it was a proper done deal - democracy side stepped because of a nonexistent crisis, a commercially naïve Mayor and a new unfamiliar CEO, and pressured by an insistence from AIA it be done now and in secret.
Bizarre. Just doesn't smell right, does it?
So, is this a good deal? Let's talk about that.
Yes in the case of AIA, they have done very well me thinks. For QLDC, not so. A very important point is that they didn't have to dilute equity; there was no crisis.
If funds were really required, there are many available sources of funds for quality assets and businesses like this without giving away your 100% ownership position.
The price they announced the deal at a price of $6.91 per new share ($27.7m) for the first 24.99% and a higher price of $7.47 per new share for the further 10% (including a special $2.2m for loss of control), and somehow the second amount goes to QLDC to spend but only if it happens. I see this as a bribe to sucker QLDC into giving up control and value for a short term fix.
Where is any justification of that price? Where is the supporting valuation? Where is the tender process? Where is the crisis and rush?
My desktop research would suggest a valuation would encapsulate the following, and these questions need to be asked and answered:
1. QAC has extensive property assets - a recognition of the land value for purpose and development potential - after all AIA is really a property developer that happens to land aircraft much as McDonald's is a real estate company that happens to sell burgers.
2. The replacement value of all infrastructure built up over the years.
3. The enterprise value this is the fastest growing airport in NZ, with strong and growing future cash flows.
4. The value of it as a 100% owned business with a unique market position with strong potential. There is significant loss of value to the remaining 75.01% shareholding, and even more serious loss if going down further to 35% results.
We have heard that a P/E multiple of 13 was used, yet we've heard a shareholding in Cairns airport was recently acquired by AIA at a P/E multiple of above 20. I venture that the value could have been at least double what we are told was fair and reasonable to the community.
Looking at projected growth, I suggest a value of $400-500m for 100% in several years time would not be unrealistic; if you were in fact a seller.
Who in their right mind would sell a 100% owned community strategic asset for 20c in the dollar in the middle of a recession? Not using some form of competitive sale process timed to maximize returns and value? Nuts.
As an open tender process was not used, the true market value for this unique asset remains at large. This is compounded by Mr Geddes being reported as saying QLDC were approached by other interested parties as buyers but they were sent away.
Why? Who were the parties Mr Geddes, or is that locked up in a confidentiality agreement too?
I'm a bit old fashioned first decide if you are a seller and if yes maximize value to yourself as there is only one bite of the cherry. If you decide to sell, it's about process and timing. A golden rule of business is that you can't sell something in secret.
Surely a competitive process (if being a seller has first properly been considered by the community and a mandate given) would have yielded a better price and deal for QLDC.
Any bid could have been tagged to deliver assured strategic alliance benefits that would then be taken into account.
It seems to me quality infrastructure assets with strong growth potential with unique market positions are highly sort-after in the world, and command a premium. Has this been squandered?
Also, AIA now needs to be managed carefully so no buyout right or pre-emptive right is triggered that would mean that QAC or QLDC buy out AIA at fair value which could be considerably higher now than the price paid by AIA. Sound commercial judgment would endorse what I've said.
A small further point to note AIA has put in $27.7m for 24.99%, giving them 24.99% of that $27.7m value, so they own 24.99% of that $27.7m so really only added a net $20.77m (24.99% of $27.7m is $6.9m) of value.
Further, if they go to 35%, that $10m odd paid over is to go to QLDC and it may not be long before ongoing expenditure requires more cash for the airport and guess what? QLDC will have to put in 65% and so pretty soon the $10m bribe to QLDC will have to go back into QAC or risk being diluted by AIA or another party by the QAC board.
I'm not sure that the taxation structure is optimized for QLDC and the community in this QAC structure something smarter people than me need to work through. Much has been made of strategic alliances and the increased passenger numbers that AIA will deliver to QAC.
Where is the evidence of this strategic alliance? Is it agreed in writing and assured, or are we just on a promise? Has it been tested as realistic? What about other parties who want a strategic alliance with us? I fear we are now married and have to be faithful to one partner.
There appears to be no reciprocal equity opportunity for QAC or QLDC in AIA, nor any sharing by AIA with QAC of benefits that accrue to AIA from increased movements at Auckland. Why not?
What inducements for directors and management have been offered by AIA?
How are we to deal with information exchanges when AIA is listed and require confidentiality agreements all the time?
Before I dispel a myth, I will be going to recommend to councillors they reflect and carefully examine the deal and the process. They are elected representatives, custodians with power. With power goes duty. They have so far heard one side of the story.
They will soon, apparently, in committee, hear from Mr Taylor and his legal people as to why the first stage of the deal is ok, and encourage them to do stage 2 to get AIA to 35%. Why wasn't this done before the deal was done?
I fear that QLDC is being advised by QAC people influenced by AIA and by other parties' lawyers, which is most imprudent and unusual.
Perhaps they will be explaining to a victim of a crime the subtle differences between burglary and theft?
I now want to turn to dispel a myth. We are told ...
AIA'S FIRST STAGE 24.99% OWNERSHIP OF QAC IS OK UNDER THE RULES.
ONLY THE SECOND STAGE INCREASE TO 35% NEEDS CONSULTATION AND QLDC APPROVAL.
EVEN IF CONSULTATION OCCURS AND COUNCIL DECIDES NO DEAL, THE QAC BOARD CAN ISSUE MORE SHARES TO AIA ANY WAY.
This is wrong in my view. Let me explain.
QLDC for many years had 100% ownership and control of a strategic asset and now has 75.01%.
AIA suddenly has 24.99%.
QAC has an option to make AIA increase to up to 35% if approved by QLDC, required because control would transfer from QLDC.
QAC directors may have committed QAC and themselves to do their best to deliver 35% to AIA in any event.
QAC's chairman and the Mayor say the rules allow ownership, but not more than 24.99% control, of QAC to transfer from the QLDC to AIA without consultation with the community and that no QLDC decision is required. Why take that position?
They didn't want delays and uncertainties of democratic and tender processes, and did a deal in secret.
The Mayor says even if QLDC doesn't approve up to 35% the QAC Board can do the deals with AIA.
A shareholders' agreement is contemplated. A board seat is contemplated. Is that right?
There is no rule that states a specific percentage in QAC is allowed, like 24.99%. They have made that up to suit what they wanted to do, and then asserted that is the rule, hoping they are right and no one notices.
They likely have legal opinions, sought and paid for by them, saying what they want.
Read the rules - I've attached them to this speech.
Naturally some decisions have been made in this process on behalf of council. A key rule says no ownership or control of a strategic asset is to transfer from QLDC without proper process and a decision by QLDC.
No means zero, not 24.99%.
This simple, core principle of community consultation and then a decision by QLDC elected councillors, not QAC directors, is to protect the community and democracy from unilateral action like this.
The QAC chairman and the Mayor should have resisted AIA's apparent requirement for no consultation and confidentiality, or no deal, as their paramount duties are to the community, not to AIA.
Everyone accepts that QAC shares and the Queenstown airport is a "strategic asset" of the community held by QLDC.
QAC holds and operates that strategic asset, as a custodian for the community and subject to certain rules. The board of directors of QAC are appointed by QLDC to manage QAC, not its shareholding.
Appointments to the QAC board are made by the shareholder by ordinary resolution (over 50% vote) AIA will not have a right to a board seat if it has up to 35% unless QLDC agrees to that in each case.
A shareholders agreement must be done with great care by QLDC, not by QAC, if AIA is to be a shareholder.
Back to is this right ...
There are rules in the Local Government Act regime to inform and protect the community from dealings with strategic assets - like transfers of ownership and control of interests in airports, which are specifically mentioned.
A specific informed mandate from the community to any transfer of ownership or control is required, and for good reason.
This is to ensure democracy has its say on significant assets and issues before action is taken, not after the event.
Strategic assets can only be dealt with if, after compliance with the rules (like proper consultation process with the community), an informed QLDC decision allows the deal to proceed.
QLDC has delegated some powers to QAC directors. Governance has rules and best practice for probity and prudence in the use of powers.
QLDC has policies, protocols and procedures it must follow, which at their heart reflect open and proper governance of public assets and matters.
QAC has a constitution, being rules directors and shareholders must observe. Further, directors and others involved should fair trade (not mislead or deceive) in business.
The QAC constitution was put in place in the 1990s when only 100% ownership by QLDC was ever contemplated.
It appears to have been a put in place with little thought, as QAC was 100% owned, and likely little thought given as a standard document used for convenience.
It does delegate a power to directors to issue new shares without offering them to existing shareholders.
However, the exercise of a delegated power comes with fiduciary and other directors' duties to be observed - like using powers for proper purposes and acting in good faith - they are in a fiduciary position.
Also, directors have to certify fairness and reasonableness to existing shareholders on new share issues. Directors must not act in any oppressive, discriminatory or unfairly prejudicial way to QLDC.
Commonsense and widely expected governance practice is also relevant, particularly in light of the nature of the assets and community interests.
QAC is covered by some public law, like the official information regime, which evidences the wider public interest to be respected by QAC and its directors.
The current Local Government regime started in 2002. Since then, the QAC constitution should be observed in the light of that new regime, including for QAC directors to have due regard for requirements of the regime on QLDC before they exercise delegated powers.
To protect QLDC from exercise of delegated powers, QAC directors are meant to keep QLDC informed of intentions by regularly providing a Statement of Intent (SOI) within a required process.
This is to warn QLDC of significant things, to allow the QLDC to consider and give direction - as examples, to warn if more capital is required and if a new shareholder is contemplated.
The latest SOI publicly available doesn't warn of a new shareholder as the source of capital or that QLDC equity could be diluted (a matter of significance to any shareholder in any company, let alone a 100% QLDC owned company holding and operating the community's most important and valuable strategic asset).
Of note, included in the latest SOI is a financial projection for 2011, 2012 and 2013 that doesn't indicate any new capital subscription is contemplated, either from QLDC or a new shareholder.
There was apparently a last minute change to the latest SOI to reference that capital subscription might be required - not that it will be done nor to a new shareholder - the tone is that QLDC might need to subscribe for more capital, which would be in the context that QLDC may be asked to subscribe as existing 100% shareholder.
There is nothing to warn councillors or the public of an intended new shareholder. Further, if there was some crisis for more funding, the SOI doesn't warn or make any case for dilution of equity to a new party as the targeted solution.
There were many other available methods of funding for this valuable asset/business without need to dilute QLDC.
The Local Government rules include a requirement that QLDC can't make certain decisions without first going through the proper consultation and decision-making processes.
These are: (a) a decision to alter significantly the intended level of service provision for any significant activity undertaken by or on behalf of the local authority, including a decision to commence or cease any such activity: (b) a decision to transfer the ownership or control of a strategic asset to or from the local authority: (c) a decision to construct, replace, or abandon a strategic asset:(d) a decision that will, directly or indirectly, significantly affect the capacity of the local authority, or the cost to the local authority, in relation to any activity identified in the long-term council community plan.
Each of (a) to (d) needs to be applied to the QAC/AIA deal. Each or all could be triggered.
The current focus is on (b), for this is the rule QAC directors say doesn't require community consultation or a QLDC decision for AIA ownership of 24.99%, but does for any further shares (to go up to 35%) due to a transfer of control away from QLDC.
They say they can transfer ownership but not control? How can this be? You can't have it both ways.
QAC directors take the position that because QAC issued new shares to AIA diluting QLDC to 75.01%, no change of ownership of the strategic asset arises, but if more shares are to be issued then consultation and a QLDC decision is required before it can be done.
They think QLDC ownership and voting rights can be diluted by 24.99% down to 75.01%, an arbitrary percentage they have conjured up as acceptable.
The rule doesn't say that. It says no transfer of ownership or control of a strategic asset from QLDC. No means zero.
If QLDC had 100% ownership before the deal and only 75.01% after, there clearly has been a transfer of 24.99% ownership away from QLDC.
It seems AIA, QAC directors and their advisers consider that because equity securities in QAC held by QLDC were not transferred, but new shares were issued to AIA, no transfer of ownership of QAC occurred.
That share issue is simply a method they used to give AIA a shareholding and dilute QLDC from 100% ownership to 75.01%, and a nonsense in light of the purpose and wording of the regime.
The method is irrelevant the effect and outcome is what counts.
The mischief to be controlled by the regime is what matters, and some cute attempt at a technical position or loophole must not be right. Why the need to be too cute?
Whichever way you look at it, QLDC went from a 100% ownership position to a 75.01% ownership position there has been a transfer of ownership of a strategic asset from the QLDC without the requisite processes and QLDC decision.
I fear democracy has been circumvented.
This needs to be exposed and fixed for everyones good.
These are the views of concerned locals, thank you for listening.
EXCERPTS FROM LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT 2002 s97:
Certain decisions to be taken only if provided for in long-term council community plan (1) This section applies to the following decisions of a local authority: (a) a decision to alter significantly the intended level of service provision for any significant activity undertaken by or on behalf of the local authority, including a decision to commence or cease any such activity: (b) a decision to transfer the ownership or control of a strategic asset to or from the local authority: (c) a decision to construct, replace, or abandon a strategic asset: (d) a decision that will, directly or indirectly, significantly affect the capacity of the local authority, or the cost to the local authority, in relation to any activity identified in the long-term council community plan.
(2) A local authority must not make a decision to which this section relates unless (a) the decision is explicitly provided for in its long-term council community plan; and (b) the proposal to provide for the decision was included in a statement of proposal prepared under section 84.
strategic asset, in relation to the assets held by a local authority, means an asset or group of assets that the local authority needs to retain if the local authority is to maintain the local authority's capacity to achieve or promote any outcome that the local authority determines to be important to the current or future well-being of the community; and includes (a) any asset or group of assets listed in accordance with section 90(2) by the local authority; and (b) any land or building owned by the local authority and required to maintain the local authority's capacity to provide affordable housing as part of its social policy; and (c) any equity securities held by the local authority in (i) a port company within the meaning of the Port Companies Act 1988: (ii) an airport company within the meaning of the Airport Authorities Act 1966 s76: Decision-making (1) Every decision made by a local authority must be made in accordance with such of the provisions of sections 77, 78, 80, 81, and 82 as are applicable.
(2) Subsection (1) is subject, in relation to compliance with sections 77 and 78, to the judgments made by the local authority under section 79.
(3) A local authority (a) must ensure that, subject to subsection (2), its decision-making processes promote compliance with subsection (1); and (b) in the case of a significant decision, must ensure, before the decision is made, that subsection (1) has been appropriately observed.
(4) For the avoidance of doubt, it is declared that, subject to subsection (2), subsection (1) applies to every decision made by or on behalf of a local authority, including a decision not to take any action.
(5) Where a local authority is authorised or required to make a decision in the exercise of any power, authority, or jurisdiction given to it by this Act or any other enactment or by any bylaws, the provisions of subsections (1) to (4) and the provisions applied by those subsections, unless inconsistent with specific requirements of the Act, enactment, or bylaws under which the decision is to be made, apply in relation to the making of the decision.
(6) This section and the sections applied by this section do not limit any duty or obligation imposed on a local authority by any other enactment.
s77: Requirements in relation to decisions (1) A local authority must, in the course of the decision-making process, (a) seek to identify all reasonably practicable options for the achievement of the objective of a decision; and (b) assess those options by considering (i) the benefits and costs of each option in terms of the present and future social, economic, environmental, and cultural well-being of the district or region; and (ii) the extent to which community outcomes would be promoted or achieved in an integrated and efficient manner by each option; and (iii) the impact of each option on the local authority's capacity to meet present and future needs in relation to any statutory responsibility of the local authority; and (iv) any other matters that, in the opinion of the local authority, are relevant; and (c) if any of the options identified under paragraph (a) involves a significant decision in relation to land or a body of water, take into account the relationship of M?ori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral land, water, sites, waahi tapu, valued flora and fauna, and other taonga.
(2) This section is subject to section 79.
s78: Community views in relation to decisions (1) A local authority must, in the course of its decision-making process in relation to a matter, give consideration to the views and preferences of persons likely to be affected by, or to have an interest in, the matter.
(2) That consideration must be given at (a) the stage at which the problems and objectives related to the matter are defined: (b) the stage at which the options that may be reasonably practicable options of achieving an objective are identified: (c) the stage at which reasonably practicable options are assessed and proposals developed: (d) the stage at which proposals of the kind described in paragraph (c) are adopted.
(3) A local authority is not required by this section alone to undertake any consultation process or procedure.
(4) This section is subject to section 79.
s79: Compliance with procedures in relation to decisions (1) It is the responsibility of a local authority to make, in its discretion, judgments (a) about how to achieve compliance with sections 77 and 78 that is largely in proportion to the significance of the matters affected by the decision; and (b) about, in particular, (i) the extent to which different options are to be identified and assessed; and (ii) the degree to which benefits and costs are to be quantified; and (iii) the extent and detail of the information to be considered; and (iv) the extent and nature of any written record to be kept of the manner in which it has complied with those sections.
(2) In making judgments under subsection (1), a local authority must have regard to the significance of all relevant matters and, in addition, to (a) the principles set out in section 14; and (b) the extent of the local authority's resources; and (c) the extent to which the nature of a decision, or the circumstances in which a decision is taken, allow the local authority scope and opportunity to consider a range of options or the views and preferences of other persons.
(3) The nature and circumstances of a decision referred to in subsection (2)(c) include the extent to which the requirements for such decision-making are prescribed in or under any other enactment (for example, the Resource Management Act 1991).
(4) Subsection (3) is for the avoidance of doubt.
S82: Principles of consultation (1) Consultation that a local authority undertakes in relation to any decision or other matter must be undertaken, subject to subsections (3) to (5), in accordance with the following principles: (a) that persons who will or may be affected by, or have an interest in, the decision or matter should be provided by the local authority with reasonable access to relevant information in a manner and format that is appropriate to the preferences and needs of those persons: (b) that persons who will or may be affected by, or have an interest in, the decision or matter should be encouraged by the local authority to present their views to the local authority: (c) that persons who are invited or encouraged to present their views to the local authority should be given clear information by the local authority concerning the purpose of the consultation and the scope of the decisions to be taken following the consideration of views presented: (d) that persons who wish to have their views on the decision or matter considered by the local authority should be provided by the local authority with a reasonable opportunity to present those views to the local authority in a manner and format that is appropriate to the preferences and needs of those persons: (e) that the views presented to the local authority should be received by the local authority with an open mind and should be given by the local authority, in making a decision, due consideration: (f) that persons who present views to the local authority should be provided by the local authority with information concerning both the relevant decisions and the reasons for those decisions.
(2) A local authority must ensure that it has in place processes for consulting with M?ori in accordance with subsection (1).
(3) The principles set out in subsection (1) are, subject to subsections (4) and (5), to be observed by a local authority in such manner as the local authority considers, in its discretion, to be appropriate in any particular instance.
(4) A local authority must, in exercising its discretion under subsection (3), have regard to (a) the requirements of section 78; and (b) the extent to which the current views and preferences of persons who will or may be affected by, or have an interest in, the decision or matter are known to the local authority; and (c) the nature and significance of the decision or matter, including its likely impact from the perspective of the persons who will or may be affected by, or have an interest in, the decision or matter; and (d) the provisions of Part 1 of the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987 (which Part, among other things, sets out the circumstances in which there is good reason for withholding local authority information); and (e) the costs and benefits of any consultation process or procedure.
(5) Where a local authority is authorised or required by this Act or any other enactment to undertake consultation in relation to any decision or matter and the procedure in respect of that consultation is prescribed by this Act or any other enactment, such of the provisions of the principles set out in subsection (1) as are inconsistent with specific requirements of the procedure so prescribed are not to be observed by the local authority in respect of that consultation.
s88: Use of special consultative procedure in relation to change of mode of delivery of significant activity (1) A local authority must use the special consultative procedure in relation to any proposal for an alteration (of the kind described in subsection (2)) in the mode by which a significant activity is undertaken by or on behalf of the local authority.
(2) The kind of alteration to which subsection (1) refers is an alteration that involves (a) a change from delivery of the activity by the local authority itself to delivery of the activity by a council-controlled organisation in which the local authority is a shareholder; or (b) a change from delivery of the activity by the local authority itself to delivery of the activity by another organisation or person; or (c) a change from delivery of the activity by a council-controlled organisation in which the local authority is a shareholder to delivery of the activity by another organisation or person.
(3) This section does not apply if (a) the proposed decision on the proposal is explicitly provided for in the council's long-term council community plan; and (b) the proposal to provide for the decision was included in a statement of proposal under section 84.
(4) In the case of any proposal to which this section applies, the statement of proposal referred to in section 83(1)(a) is (a) a detailed statement of the proposal; and (b) a statement of the reasons for the proposal; and (c) an analysis of the reasonably practicable options, including the proposal, identified under section 77(1); and (d) any other information that the local authority identifies as relevant.
Significance, in relation to any issue, proposal, decision, or other matter that concerns or is before a local authority, means the degree of importance of the issue, proposal, decision, or matter, as assessed by the local authority, in terms of its likely impact on, and likely consequences for, (a) the current and future social, economic, environmental, or cultural well-being of the district or region: (b) any persons who are likely to be particularly affected by, or interested in, the issue, proposal, decision, or matter: (c) the capacity of the local authority to perform its role, and the financial and other costs of doing so significant, in relation to any issue, proposal, decision, or other matter, means that the issue, proposal, decision, or other matter has a high degree of significance.
