New Zealand is an outlier among comparable democracies in granting its elected representatives just three years in office before they have to front up to the electorate and reapply for their jobs.
It has often been suggested by academics and professional politicians that a longer term would be preferable.
However, New Zealanders have stoically rejected that proposition, to the extent of voting down such a notion not once but twice in referendums.
This is despite strong arguments from across the political spectrum that three years — two if you count the months which have to be devoted to campaigning rather than governing in the final year of a government — is simply not enough time to, firstly, pass a legislative programme through Parliament and, secondly, to have any evidence to show it is actually effective.
Arguably, the wise-headed New Zealand voters have solved this "problem" for themselves. They have elected only two one-term governments since World War 2, most parties being given six or nine years to prove their worth.
However, the idea has not gone away. Local Government New Zealand is strongly in support and last year polled on the issue, its survey recording 65% support for the four-year council terms.
Last year an Independent Electoral Review commissioned by the previous government reported back and it called for another referendum on the question.
It is long-standing Act New Zealand policy and many other political parties, from both sides of the House, support the idea.
This week it was announced, as per the coalition agreement, legislation to enable a four-year term of Parliament, subject to a referendum, would be introduced and supported by the governing parties to select committee.
So, the idea is inevitable, bar the final say of the New Zealand voter? Well, not so fast.
The difficulty the longer-term proposal faces, as things stand, is that it is highly complicated, possibly unnecessarily so.
The question any new government would then have to ask would be if it wanted to trade an extra year in power in exchange for submitting its proposals to more intense scrutiny — and potentially even outright rejection — through the select committee process.
Hypothetically, had the present government opted for such an arrangement, it would be in place until 2027, but it would likely have had central policies on its agenda, such as resource management reform, subject to a scathing majority report from the committee considering that legislation.
There is nothing wrong with greater select committee examination of legislation — in fact, that would be a welcome thing.
What is more problematic is the idea we can only get such valuable interrogation of a government’s proposals if it is granted an extra year in power.
More simple, more straight-forward — and possibly more desirable — could be the additional scrutiny provisions and a four-year term, without any need for one to be dependent on the other.
A referendum on the matter could be held during the next General Election, in 2026.
However, a separate vote purely on this point, regardless of the additional expense, would be preferable so it not become a de facto vote of confidence on the government of the day — something which may well have been a factor in previous ballots on this question.
A vote in 2026 may also come too soon: this is a decision with great constitutional ramifications and discussion should not be rushed.
In a representative democracy, few questions are more fundamental than the laws which govern who is entitled to be our voice in public affairs, and for how long.
It is heartening that support for further debate on this issue is, so far, widespread and non-partisan. It deserves full and respectful debate and deep consideration — both by the MPs making the proposal and by the citizens who will vote on it.
