The army has acknowledged it was hit hard by attrition and a lack of training due to a 21-month Covid-19 deployment, involving thousands of soldiers, to managed isolation facilities.
In late May, two culminating exercises were undertaken by regular force trainees from the 1st Command Support Regiment.
Exercise Bassett Black was held at the Tekapo training area as the culminating exercise for Royal New Zealand Corps of Signals trainees at the end of a 99-day training course, led by the 4th Signals Squadron.
A post-activity report, obtained under the Official Information Act, reveals the $30,000 exercise was affected by "a significant absence of experience", in part due to staff having other commitments, including the other exercise.
There was no firm plan for Covid-19 containment, the report observed, and several senior staff tested positive for Covid-19 in the first week of deployment, inexperienced junior staff having to fill in as a result.
Skills trainees acquired at the start of the course had faded by the time the exercise arrived.
The vehicle fleet was poorly maintained and several Pinzgauers which broke down on the way to the training area could not be used.
Some trainees were also observed to have "little to no understanding of orders", which was put down to lack of exposure and formal tutelage in basic training.
Vehicle stops were poorly selected, and insufficient rations meant soldiers had to spend their own money to buy lunch when they were returning from the exercise.
The other culminating exercise, Hades Gate, was held at the Dip Flat training area in Marlborough, for trainees on a course for the 3rd Signal Squadron (electronic warfare).
The post-exercise report found lead-up training was limited due to staffing issues.
A generator used for the exercise became unserviceable on the second day, with no back-up.
As a result, the electronic warfare co-ordination centre (EWCC) was run off mains power for the rest of the exercise.
Chairs and tables inside the EWCC were "unserviceable", and low overnight temperatures affected the ability of analysts to concentrate.
A Unimog carrying stores was incorrectly loaded, and it was recommended that "vehicles must deploy with their required safety equipment".
The tactical skill of some junior soldiers was described as low, with torches and e-cigarettes being used in concealed positions, and incorrect weapons drills being observed.
Overall both exercises were beneficial, the reports noted.
New Zealand Defence Force land component commander Colonel Duncan Roy said the reports should not be read in isolation and the two signal squadrons were smaller units who worked in complex skill-areas and were tasked with providing command support.
"The reports may seem harsh but that’s the way we operate.
"The army prides itself on objective, honest and ruthless self-reporting.
"That’s how you get to be good and stay good," Col Roy said.
The Covid-19 response deployment to guard managed isolation and quarantine facilities was the largest domestic operation in living memory.
As a result, the army had not been able to train and exercise as it had previously, and was experiencing significant attrition.
Exercises were designed to put pressure on people and equipment, to prepare them for combat situations.
There were a number of areas which needed to be improved on, and time spent training would address them, Col Roy said.
The army had started work on a five-year pathway to regenerate its core capabilities, and had resumed larger domestic exercises along with partner nations.
"The aim is not to recreate an army that existed before the pandemic but to prepare a world-class army that is better trained, well-equipped and fully prepared for a spectrum of military operations," Col Roy said.
