Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown is in China signing an agreement with the superpower while New Zealand’s foreign minister, Winston Peters, complains about not being consulted.
Is this a case of an overbearing colonial power endeavouring to reassert control or Mr Brown ignoring a previous agreement and pushing his country’s privileges too far?
The Pacific has become a strategic sphere where China is pushing and prodding for power and influence. China gains support from a collection of tiny nations in international forums and potential access to resources.
Traditionally, that might have been fishing. Seabed mining is the latest focus. Deep-sea ports are another issue.
China has stepped up its aid and support recently and won over a Solomons Islands prime minister. A deal, negotiated in secret, included an agreement to "enhance co-operation on law enforcement and security matters". It allows the government to call on China for police and military help.
As Mr Brown insists, the Cooks’ deal is economic. Indubitably, it could not have been otherwise. Nevertheless, economic is tied to strategic, certainly the way China operates.
Mr Peters said, according to a 2001 agreement, such major deals should have been consulted on. Mr Brown’s present trip to China had "blindsided both the Cook Islands people and ourselves".
New Zealand and the Cooks are in "free association" and New Zealand must respect Cook Islands independence and allow it to manage its domestic and international affairs. But the Cooks rely on this country for financial help and defence.
Cook Islanders are also New Zealand citizens, and New Zealand currency is used. Its population, about 15,000, is only a little more than Oamaru’s. About 100,000 people living in New Zealand identify as Cook Island Māori.
The Cook Island situation vis-a-vis most other Pacific nations and New Zealand is different in scale and rights.
The Lowy Institute, Sydney, puts the level of spending in foreign aid at $US517 million (about $NZ913m on this week’s exchange rates) between 2008 and 2022. New Zealand’s share was $US219m ($NZ386m) and China’s $US112m ($NZ197m).
China and New Zealand worked together on a large Rarotongan water supply project.
In the long run, New Zealand will be unable to financially match China’s offers to Pacific nations, and it should not try to.
China has an international history of using loans, which it can later use for leverage, rather than grants. This has been changing.
Economically, the Cook Islands suffers from the tyranny of distance plus lack of scale. Seabed mining rights, although the environmental implications might be dire, are one wild card that could change the outlook.
Mr Brown had also proposed a separate Cook Islands passport to operate alongside the New Zealand passport. Unsurprisingly, Mr Peters was unhappy with that plan. It has been dropped, at least for now.
There also appears to be growing concerns in Rarotonga about Mr Brown’s lack of consultation on both the China deal and passports.
The balance between New Zealand and the Cook Islands is delicate. The Cooks have the right to set up their own arrangements and go their own way if they so choose.
However, given the historic, family, cultural, social and economic ties, New Zealand’s high levels of aid over decades and New Zealand citizenship, Cook Island leaders would be wise to continue to work with this country. As a joint statement last May after the 2024 New Zealand — Cook Island Joint Ministerial Forum, said, "ministers reconfirmed their mutual commitment to consult each other on issues of importance".
That statement also "reiterated" a "commitment to Pacific-led solutions to challenges in our region".
Surely, a major agreement with China is an issue of "importance".
